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Introduction
If collusion was often considered in a market facing uncertainty (Bag-
well and Staiger (1997)), or imperfect information (Athey and Bagwell (2008),
Harrington and Skrzypacz (2010)), the relationship between collusion and in-
vestment is less known. That is the purpose of what follows.
This work studies a dynamic game in discrete time with innite peri-
ods. In each period rms make two decisions, investment (or disinvestment)
in production capacity and the quantities they produce. Companies can
choose to increase or reduce capacity. The irreversibility of decisions is mod-
eled by the di¤erence between purchase price and sale of building (when
the gap is zero, the decisions are totally reversible). In each period rms
are competing in Cournot, the quantities produced are of course limited by
production capacity. The model is presented in section 1.3.
In comparison with the Account, Jenny and Rey (2003), capacity is
endogenous, modied in each period, and the game of competition is a game
of Cournot competition while Account Jenny and Rey (2003) are interested
in a game competition in Bertrand-Edgeworth. In comparison with Boyer,
Lasserre and Moreaux (2010), demand is not random, so there is no uncer-
tainty and the equilibrium concept used is far less restrictive than the Markov
equilibrium. Production capacities are not discrete and are not irreversible.
These papers are presented in section 1.1 and 1.2.
To dene the collusion, it is necessary to determine a non-collusive
equilibrium. In a repeated game, this benchmark equilibrium is constituted
by the repetition of the equilibrium of the one shot game. In a stochastic
game, as here, we can not implement this solution. We must therefore dene
a reference equilibrium. This point is develloped in section 2.1. In section 2.2
and 2.3 we prove the existence and the unicity of this benchmark equilibrium.
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If we discretize the game (ie the actions of the players belong to a
nite space, which can be chosen innitesimally large), section 3.1 presents
a folk theorem (the proof uses the result of Horner, Sugaya , Old and Taka-
hashi (2010)). This theorem tells us that when the discount rate tends to
1, the set of equilibrium payo¤ vectors tends to the set of equilibrium payo¤
vectors of the innitely repeated Cournot game (without cost or production
capacity). The theorem is therefore a borderline result, which gives an equiv-
alence between this game and the Cournot game (innitely repeated) when
players are innitely patient. Finally, section 3.2 studies conditions for the
existence of a specic collusive equilibrium (the Grim-Trigger equilibrium in
capacities).
1 Problematic
Impact of capacity of production on the collusion
To study the collusion, a dynamic model of innitely repeated game in
which enterprises compete at each period is used. Stage competitive models
used are Cournot, Bertrand, or variations of these games. The rst articles
implicitly assumed that each company can meet any demand, and this at each
period of the game The idea that companies cannot serve the whole market
because they are limited in production capacity, and the impact due to this
restriction on collusion, have been recently studied in an article Compte,
Jenny and Rey (2003).
In this article, companies have an exogenous production capacity
(which does not vary over time) and compete an innite number of times in
Bertrand-Edgeworth framework (with inelastic demand) (ie sales are limited
by their capacity). (The time is modeled discretely). The authors determine
the level of the minimum discounted rate allowing collusion (dened as al-
lowing companies to make prots above the static equilibrium of the game).
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This threshold depends on the initial capacities given a priori. More pre-
cisely, if we note ki the capacity of the rm and M the mass of consumers,
two di¤erent cases exist:
- If all rms except the dominant (which has the largest capacity)
can cover the whole market: There is collusion if the discount rate  is larger
than 1   M
K
(where K is the sum of capacities of all rms on the market).
The idea is that smaller capacities increase collusion because they reduce
the incentives to deviate. Note that this result corresponds to the classical
results when rms are not limited ( > 1   1
n
, where n is the number of
rms).
- In the other cases (where "small" rms cannot cover the whole
market) the discount rates allowing collusion are greater than k
n
K
(where
kn is the capacity of the largest rm). A reduced capacity for small rms
therefore reduces the possibility of collusion by reducing the opportunities to
punish collusion.
The production capacity thus a¤ect the collusion that may appear in
game equilibria. The impact of capacity depends on a degree of asymmetry
in capacities and greater capacities for small rms can encourage collusion.
Recall that in this article, the authors assume that the production
capacity is exogenously xed throughout the game. In other words the ques-
tion of choosing the optimal investment for a company is not asked.
There exists another article, written by Feuerstein and Gersbach
(2003), which study collusion (more exactly the existance of a punishment
strategy, the Grim-Trigger one) when investments are irreversible. They
nd that irreversibility increase the possibilities of collusion. However, the
investment is costless, which means that all rms can increase their capacities
freely; even if the capacity has a per period cost. Hence it is more a problem
of commitment than a problem of optimal investment.
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Optimal investment choices
There exists a range of literature which concerns the optimal choice of
capacity of production, the theory of real options. It has mainly focused on
the study of investment choices in an uncertain environment where the future
prots of the investment in question does not depend on the choices of other
rms in the market (see the book by Dixit and Pindyck (1994)). The study
of the relationship between competition and investment is more recent, but
does not take into account the mechanisms of collusion. It is summarized
for example in Knight-Roignant, Flath, Huchzermeier and Trigeorgis (2010).
Competition pushes rms to invest earlier. Some characteristics (the number
of rms on the market, the greater divisibility of investments or the existence
of an advantage to invest rst) encourage rms to invest even earlier. Other
characteristics (such as rm heterogeneity, the existence of an advantage to
invest in second or in some cases incomplete information), encourage them
instead to invest later.
Articles by Boyer, Lasserre, Mariotti and Moreaux (2004) and Boyer
and Moreaux Lasserre (2010), study the interaction between competition
and investment choices. These are the only ones discussing some collusion in
capacity.
The rst article examines the case of a duopoly facing a Bertrand-
Edgeworth competition in continuous time with innite horizon. Firms start
with a production capacity equal to zero and decide when increasing their
capacity (so the rst decision to increase its capacity is in fact a decision of
entry). These investments are irreversible and costly. Capacities are assumed
discrete (each rm can not hold that 0, 1 or 2 unit) and the market is covered
by two units of capacity. The reserve price of the game to the Bertrand-
Edgeworth is assumed to be random. Specically it is a Brownian di¤usion:
dPt = Ptdt+ PtdWt
where  is the volatility of prices, the growth rate  and r the interest
rate.
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The equilibrium concept used is Markov perfect equilibrium (where
owned capacities are the state space) and subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
This implies that the strategies, capabilities and price on a given date, only
depend on the installed capacity to the previous date. Punishment in period
t can only depend on the installed capacity in time t  1 and not on the past
history of the game. Authors speak of collusion when rms agree to delay
their investments. Equilibria depend on the growth rate and on the volatility
of the reserve price.
If r < 2 + 2 (high volatility or rate of growth exceeds the rate of
interest), the Markov equilibrium is unique, and the two companies buy each
a capacity equal to 1, and realize this investment when a monopoly would
have invested. There is therefore no preemption by competitors (competition
does not encourage them to invest earlier), nor reduction of prots in the
industry: everything happens as if companies maximize the joint prot.
If r > 2 + 2 (low volatility and average growth rate below the
interest rates) there are several Markov equilibria. When the initial price
is low enough, whatever the equilibrium is, the two companies invest at the
same time a capacity equal to 1, but do it earlier than would do a monopoly.
More precisely, each rm invests at the time when, if it did not invest, the
opponent would buy two units of capacity. When the initial price is high,
di¤erent equilibria give di¤erent ways to invest. In particular, there exists
an equilibrium where each rm buys two capacities (thereby inducing a zero
prot).
Boyer, Lasserre and Moreaux (2010) generalize these results to the
case of Cournot competition. The duopoly compete à la Cournot in contin-
uous time (but quantities are limited for each date by production capacity).
Capacities are discrete (the market is covered by a number N of units of
capacity and a rm may have a number 1,2, .., N capacity), initial capac-
ities are not necessarily zero, and companies may increase their investment
irreversibly. The price is assumed to be random and we have:
Pt = YtD
 1(q1t + q
2
t );
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where Yt follows a di¤usion browienne and where q1t and q
2
t are the quan-
tities produced by rms 1 and 2. Such specication of the stochastic demand
implies that the quantities produced (given capacities) do not depend on the
random variable Yt (production costs are assumed zero). Another way to see
this hypothesis is to consider that the price of investment is stochastic and
the demand is not.
As in their previous paper, the authors characterize a tacit collusion
equilibrium as a period during which rms invest simultaneously, by contra-
diction with the other type of equilibrium, said preemption, in which rms
invest before their opponents.
The authors nd that competition may be tougher in the early stages
after developement market is. Indeed, when one rm or less is on the market,
the collusive equilibrium cannot be realized. This implies that the initial
investment comes sooner than what is socially optimal.
When the initial capacities are di¤erent, the smaller rm takes the
risk of investing, and eventually catches up the largest rms (although it tries
to maintain a capacity gap).
Periods of collusion may happen in equilibrium when the two rms
are in the market. As in their article of (2004), increasing the volatility or
the market growth rate makes these episodes of tacit collusion more likely.
When rms have equal sizes, such strategies maximize joint prots, which is
not the case when rms have di¤erent sizes.
Model and notation
In our model, n rms produce an homogenous good and compete on
several periods. The time is discrete and the horizon is innite. At each time
t, the prot of rm i depends on its quantity of good produced qit, and on the
total quantities produced by all the other rms, q it . A rm cannot choose
a quantity bigger than the one induced by its capacity of production at date
t, Kit . Production costs are normalized to zero (without loss of generality
when the demand is linear). The prot of time t due to the choice of sold
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quantities is:
~it(K
i
t ; q
i
t; q
 i
t ) = D
 1(qit + q
 i
t )min(q
i
t;K
i
t):
The capacity of production of the rm is assumed to be quasi-irreversible,
wich means than there exists a buying price p+ which is strictly superior to
a selling price p . The case of total irreversibilty can be treated by assuming
p  = 0; if rms can decrease their capacities without cost, or by assuming
that p  =  1. The total prot of rm i at date t is
it(K
i
t ; q
i
t; K
 i
t ; q
 i
t ) = ~
i
t(K
i
t ; q
i
t; q
 i
t )  p+(Kit  Kit 1)+ + p (Kit  Kit 1) .
We assume that each rme has the same discount factor, so the intertem-
poral prot of rm i is:
i(Kit ; q
i
t; K
 i
t ; q
 i
t ) = (1  )
+1X
t=1
t 1it(K
i
t ; q
i
t; K
 i
t ; q
 i
t )
Where Ki0 is the initial capacity of rm f .
Note that this is a dynamic game but it is not a repeated game, be-
cause the pay-o¤ of one period depends on existing capacities in the previous
period. The classical results (as the folk theorem) on repeated games cannot
be applied.
We also assume that the inverse demand function is linear,
D 1(Qt) = A Qt:
Hence, we assume that the rms quantitites and the capacities cannot
be greater than A, as A is su¢ cient to cover the market. So rms can choose
their capacities and quantities in [0; A]. We note this game GI([0; A]).
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2 Non-collusive equilibrium
Denition
The denition of the notion of collusion is not always an easy issue.
Usually, when we face a repeated game with only one Nash equilibrium in
the stage game, the collusion is dened as a sub-game perfect equilibrium (of
the dynamic game) which gives higher prots that the repetition of the stage
game Nash equilibrium. This repetition of the stage game Nash equilibrium
is a sub-game perfect equilibrium of the repeated game as we are indeed in a
repeated game. However, in our case, we are not facing a repeated game. So
we need to nd a sub-game perfect equilibrium (which will be the benchmark
case) to dene collusion.
The rst idea is to restrict the class of equilibria to markov perfect
equilibria. Indeed, under non-collusive competition, the rms should take
their decisons only according to the level of capacities of the industry, and
not according to the history. In this case, rms choose at each period, the
quantity of the one-shot Cournot game with limited capacity. However, the
capacity level can depend of the capacity of the previous period, and so this
restriction is not strong enought to forbid the possibility of punition. For
exemple a Grim-Trigger strategy (like the one considered in sub-section 3.2),
is a markovian perfect equilibrium which permits to index punishment on
capacities.
Another point is to consider that, as demand and price are constant
in time and there are no information issues, the quantities and capacities
must be constant in time after a while. In our case, rms have no compet-
itive reasons which justify to delay the investment compared to this "long
time" investment level (investment prices are linear). So we can consider the
markov perfect equilibrium in which, on the equilibrium path, rms install in
the rst period their long term capacity (and do not change their capacity af-
ter that). However, this is not su¢ cient to dene the benchmark equilibrium,
as the Grim-Trigger strategy previously mentionned veries such condition.
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Hence we dene the competitive equilibrium as the one in which rms invest
to a given level of capacity in the rst time and never change it, whatever
the industry capacity is at the previous period.
Denition 1 : A competitive (or benchmark) equilibrium is dened as strate-
gies in which rms invest at the rst period, do not move their capacity after
that, and produce at maximal capacity. Formaly it gives:
8i,  Kit ; qit = (qi; qi):
Note that this is obviously a markov perfect equilibrium, as it does
not depend of any history. The purpose of the present part is to show that the
denition above dene an unique sub-game perfect equilibrium (the bench-
mark equilibrium) and to characterize it. Proposition 1 gives the best re-
sponse of a rm facing competitors playing such strategies, and Theorem 1
etablishes the existence and the unicity of the competitive equilibrium, and
characterizes it. Before presenting these results in the general case, we give
the intuition when there is only two rms on the market.
Duopoly case
The rst point is to nd the best response of one rm when the other
rms play the benchmark strategy. We nd that the best response is also to
play the benchmark strategy, with qi (the level of capacity and of produced
quantity) such that:
qi =
8>><>>:
~q+(qj) if Ki0  ~q+(qj)
Ki0 if ~q
+(qj) < Ki0 < ~q
 (qj)
~q (qj) if Ki0  ~q (qj)
9>>=>>; ;
10
where
~q+(qj) =
A  qj   (1  )p+
3
;
~q (qj) =
A  qj   (1  )p 
3
:
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Best Responses of player 2 for di¤erent values of K0:
Ý0,0Þ
ÝK01,K02Þ
K01/q1
K02/q* 2
q* +Ýq1Þ
q* ?Ýq1Þ
A?Ý1?NÞp?
3
A?Ý1?NÞp+
3
q*Ýq?iÞ
Ý0,0Þ
ÝK01,K02Þ
K01/q1
K02/q* 2
q* +Ýq1Þ
q* ?Ýq1Þ
A?Ý1?NÞp?
3
A?Ý1?NÞp+
3
q*Ýq?iÞ
Ý0,0Þ
ÝK01, K02Þ
K01/q1
K02/q* 2
q* +Ýq1Þ
q* ?Ýq1Þ
A?Ý1?NÞp?
3
A?Ý1?NÞp+
3
q*Ýq?iÞ
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We can see that the best response is asymetric, depends on the ini-
tial capacity, and is smaller than the best response of Cournot without cost.
Furthermore, there exist initial capacities such that the best response is to
not change this capacities (see last graph in Best Responses of player 2 for
di¤erent values of K0). The next step is to see that there exist initial ca-
pacities for which neither rm 1 nor rm 2 change their capacities. Indeed,
in the graph Best responses of players 1 and 2, the equilibrium, given by the
intersection of the best responses of player 1 and 2, is (K10 ; K
2
0).
Best responses of players 1 and 2:
K01
K02
Ý0,0Þ
ÝK01,K02Þ
q* ?Ýq1Þq* +Ýq1Þ
ßq* ? à?1Ýq1Þ
ßq* + à?1Ýq1Þ
This implies the existence of a space of initial capacities, H, such
that for each vector of initial capacities in H, the benchmark equilibrium
is to not change these capacities (and to produce at maximal capacities).
This space is delimited by the straights of best response (more precisely the
"partial" best response q+ and q ).
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No-move space in two dimensions:
q?
q?
q+
q+Ý0,0Þ
Ýq+, q+Þ
Ýq?,q?Þ
q! ?
q! ?
q! +
q! +
Ýq! +,q! ?Þ
H
Ýq! ?,q! +Þ
K02/q* 2
K01/q1
Note that we have q^+ = A (1 )(2p
+ p )
3
, and q^  = A (1 )(2p
  p+)
3
:
We can see thatH is the convex hull of the intersection points of the straights
of best responses (~q+ and ~q ). The next step is to nd how the rms change
their capacities when they do not begin in H. In fact they will join H in one
shot (invest to a vector of capacity in H), but the point of H depends on
some areas on initial capacities, what is summarized in the following table:
Condition on (K10 ; K
2
0) Strategy of player 1 Strategy of player 2
(K10 ; K
2
0) 2 H (K1t ; q1t ) = (K10 ; K10) (K2t ; q2t ) = (K20 ; K20)
K10  q+ and K20  q+ (K1t ; q1t ) = (q+; q+) (K2t ; q2t ) = (q+; q+)
K10  q  and K20  q  (K1t ; q1t ) = (q ; q ) (K2t ; q2t ) = (q ; q )
K10  q^+ and K20  q^  (K1t ; q1t ) = (q^+; q^+) (K2t ; q2t ) = (q^ ; q^ )
K10  q^  and K20  q^+ (K1t ; q1t ) = (q^ ; q^ ) (K2t ; q2t ) = (q^+; q^+)
K10 < ~q
+(K20) and K
2
0 2]q+; q^ [ (K1t ; q1t ) = (~q+(K20); ~q+(K20)) (K2t ; q2t ) = (K20 ; K20)
K10 > ~q
 (K20) and K
2
0 2]q+; q^ [ (K1t ; q1t ) = (~q (K20); ~q (K20)) (K2t ; q2t ) = (K20 ; K20)
K10 2]q+; q^ [ and K20 < ~q+(K10) (K1t ; q1t ) = (K10 ; K10) (K2t ; q2t ) = (~q+(K10); ~q+(K10))
K10 2]q+; q^ [ and K20 > ~q (K10) (K1t ; q1t ) = (K10 ; K10) (K2t ; q2t ) = (~q (K10); ~q (K10))
:
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Move from the di¤erent areas of initial capacities:
q?
q?
q+
q+ K0
1
K02
Ý0,0Þ
Ýq+, q+Þ
Ýq?, q?Þ
q! ?
q! ?
q! +
q! +
Ýq! +,q! ?Þ
H
Ýq! ?,q! +Þ
This result can be proved by Theorem 1, which we present in the
following sub-section, or by reasoning case by case using the best response,
as presented in the following graphic.
Equilibrium when initial capacities are not in H:
K01
K02
Ý0,0Þ
ÝK01,K02Þ
q* ?Ýq1Þq* +Ýq1Þ
ßq* ? à?1Ýq1Þ
ßq* + à?1Ýq1Þ
H
Ýq* 1,q* 2Þ
General case
Proposition 1 (Best response) : For any rm i, assume that others set
their capacities in period 1, and produce at maximal capacities, so (Kjt ; q
j
t ) =
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(qj; qj) 8t: Then the best response of rm i is also to set its capacity at period
1, and to produce at maximal capacity, which means:
(Kit ; q
i
t) = (~q(q
 i); ~q(q i)): (1)
The optimal level of capacity ~q(q i) is given by:
~q(q i) =
8>><>>:
~q+(q i) if Ki0  ~q+(q i)
Ki0 if ~q
+(q i) < Ki0 < ~q
 (q i)
~q (q i) if Ki0  ~q (q i)
9>>=>>; ; (2)
where ~q+(q i) = A q
 i (1 )p+
n+1
; ~q (q i) = A q
 i (1 )p 
n+1
, (with q i =
Pn
j=1
j 6=i
qj).
Proof. [Proof (Best response)] : see annex 1.
Note that there exists an interval of q i, where rm i stays at its
initial capacity:
[A  (1  )p+   (n+ 1)Ki0; A  (1  )p    (n+ 1)Ki0].
This is due to the quasi-irreversibility of the investment. Indeed, if the invest-
ment is fully reversible (which means that p+ = p ) then this interval does
not exist (formally, it is reduced to a single point, but as the best response
is continuous, it does not matter).
When rms install a capacity that di¤er from its initial capacity, it
is the best response of Cournot (in a one stage game) with some cost which
di¤ers depending on whether the rm will reduce or increase its capacity.
When the rm increase its capacity, the cost, (1  )p+, reects the fact that
even if the rm installs its capacity at the rst period, the cost is shared
between all the periods. Indeed, the more patient is the rm ( ! 1) the
more it will invest, even if it pays the same price, as the rm values the future
more and absorbs a larger share of its investment in the future.
When the rm decreases its initial capacity, it also faces a cost, (1 
)p , which must be viewed as an opportunity cost. Indeed, when the rm
has decreased its capacity until the Cournot level (without cost) it can do
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better by selling some capacities (as the derivative of the prot is close to 0
when we are near enough to the cournot level without cost).
So the best response is asymetric, depending of the initial capacity,
and smaller than the best response of Cournot without cost. As the best
response is to not change its initial capacity for some opponent strategies,
we can dene the no-move space H, as a space of capacities such that, if the
vector of initial capacity of the industry is in H, rms do not change their
capacity at the benchmark equilibrium.
Proposition 2 (No-move space) : Let
H =
(
(q1; :::; qn) : 8i; qi 2
"
A  (1  )p+  Pj 6=i qj
2
;
A  (1  )p+  Pj 6=i qj
2
#)
;
(3)
and
q+ =
A  (1  )p+
n+ 1
; q  =
A  (1  )p 
n+ 1
: (4)
Then, H contains the points (q ; ::; q ) and (q+; ::; q+)
Most important, if the initial quantities are in H, the only competitive
equilibrium is to not change the capacities, so:
8i (Kit ; qit) = (Ki0; Ki0):
Proof. [Proof (No-move space)] : It is obvious that the points

A (1 )p 
n+1
; ::; A (1 )p
 
n+1

and

A (1 )p+
n+1
; ::; A (1 )p
+
n+1

are in H.
If (K10 ; ::; K
n
0 ) 2 A, then, whatever i, Ki0 is the best response to the other
initial capacities by Proposition 1.
If (K10 ; ::; K
n
0 ) is an Nash equilibrium, then for all j, K
j
0 is the best re-
sponse to other initial capacities, but if (K10 ; ::; K
n
0 ) =2 A, there exists j such
that 2Kj0 =2
h
A  (1  )p+  Pj 6=iKj0 ; A  (1  )p+  Pj 6=iKj0i, so Kj0 is
not a best response to other initial capacities, and (K10 ; ::; K
n
0 ) is not a sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium.
We can characterize this space as a convex hull of the intersection
points of straights of best response (q+(:) and q (:)).
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Geometric characterization of H:
For all k; E  f1; ::; ng; let akE = (q1; ::; qn) be the point such that:
8j 2 E; qj = A  (1  ) [(n+ 1  k)p
+   (n  k)p ]
n+ 1
;
8j =2 E; qj = A  (1  ) [(k + 1)p
    kp+]
n+ 1
:
Let H = fakE : 9k 2 f0; ::; ng; E  f1; ::; ng with card(E) = kg:
Then we have H = conv( H), with conv( H) is the convex hull of H, which
means the most little convex set that contains H.
Note that in some asymetric case, there can be some points of H
where one rm produces more than the usual Cournot quantity (without
cost). This is due to the fact that the other rms produce less.
The main theorem consists in understanding how rms join the space
H when they begin in another place. More precisely, it provides the existence
and the unicity of the benchmark equilibrium, characterizing it as the point
of H which is the nearest of initial capacities, for some distance.
Theorem 1 (Benchmark equilibrium) : For any initial capacities (K10 ; ::; K
n
0 ) 2
Rn+, there exists one and only one benchmark equilibrium. Firm i installs ca-
pacity qi at the rst period and always products at full capacity. The vector of
capacities (q1; ::; qn) is the only vector which solvesmin(q1;::;qn)2H
Pn
i=1 jqi  Ki0j.
Proof. [Proof (Benchmark equilibrium)] : See annex 2.
This theorem has several implications.
If K0  (q ; ::; q ), then the benchmark equilibrium is
8i, (Kit ; qit) = (q ; q ):
So when all the rms are small enough, the competitive equilibrium is unique
and symetric.
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If K0  (q+; ::; q+), then the benchmark equilibrium is
8i, (Kit ; qit) = (q+; q+);
So when all the rms are big enough, the competitive equilibrium is also
unique and symetric.
Of course, this competitive equilibrium is not the same in both cases.
A way to interpret this result is to think that the industry faces a non-
expected demand shock. In this case, for the same level of demand obtained
after the shock, the industry capacities (and the thougness of the competi-
tion) are not the same if the demand was high or low before the shock.
Note that when the investment is totally reversible (p+ = p ) H
is a single point, which means that initial capacities have no role in the
competitive equilibirum, which is the equilibrium of the repeated Cournot
game with a marginal cost (1  )p+.
There are two denitions for irreversible investment. When p  = 0,
which means that rms cannot sell their capacities but can "throw" it, notice
that the Cournot quantities (of repeated game without cost) are available
when rms have important initial capacities. When p  =  1, H is the
space above the plans q+(:).
No-move space in the duopoly case when investments are irreversible:
q?
q?
q+
q+Ý0,0Þ
Ýq+, q+Þ
Ýq?,q?Þ
q! ?
q! ?
q! +
q! +
Ýq! +,q! ?Þ
H
Ýq! ?,q! +Þ
K02/q* 2
K01/q1
In this case, if the initial capacities are not in H, the only symetric
equilibrim is (q+; ::q+), and rms invest at this level of capacities when K0 
(q+; ::q+). In the other case, there is an asymmetry at the equilibrium.
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3 Results on collusion
Folk theorem
In this part, we nd a folk theorem using some "little" restriction on
our model. More precisely, we show that if we discretize the set of feasi-
ble capacities and quantities of the rms, then, when  ! 1, our model is
equivalent to the innite Cournot repeated game without any cost. First we
dene the discrete game considered, and present the links between the con-
tinuous game. After that, we present this Folk theorem and then discuss the
usefulness of such asymptotic result to understand the e¤ect of investment.
Denition 2 : For k 2 N, let f0; Agk = f0; 12kA; 22kA; ::; Ag be a discrete ap-
proximation of [0; A]. Let Gk([0; A]) be the investment game described in part
1, when quantities and capacities are choosen in the discrete space f0; Agk
and not in [0; A]. Let Ek (K0) be the set of sub-game perfect equilibrium pay-
o¤s of the investment game Gk([0; A]).
Theorem 2 (Folk Theorem) : For all k 2 N, and for all K0 2k f0; Agn,
we have,
lim
!1
Ek (K0) = F
; (5)
where F  is the set of the feasible payo¤s of the innite Cournot repeated
game. It means,
F  =
(
 2 [0; A]n :
nX
i=1
i <

A
2
2)
: (6)
Proof. : The formal proof is reported in annex 3. ùit applies the Folk
Theorem of the article "Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games:
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an Algorithm for  ! 1 and a Folk Theorem" of Johannes Hörner, Takuo
Sugaya, Satoru Takahashi and Nicolas Vielle (2010) to our case. Intuitively,
the runk assumptions represent the fact that players can identify the actions
taken by the others. As our game faces no uncertainty and no imperfect
monitoring, these runk conditions are veried. A rst part veries this runk
condition, and a second part characterizes the individualy rational and fea-
sible payo¤s.
The theorem is obtained for the discrete game Gk([0; A]) and not
for the continuous game G([0; A]): In fact, even if f0; Agk ! [0; A] when
k ! +1, the formal link between the discrete and the continuous game is not
easy to understand. Intuitively we should have E(K0) = limk!+1Ek (K0)
or E(K0) = \kEk (K0):, but this has not yet been proven, also the following
results reinforce this initial intuition.
Consider the investment game with continous payo¤ (as G([0; A]))
but with a payo¤ function k which is a discrete approximation of  (the
payo¤ function of G([0; A]));
k
 
qit; K
i
t
i=1;::;n
t=0;::;+1

= 
 b(2k + 1)qitc
2k + 1
;
b(2k + 1)Kitc
2k + 1
i=1;::;n
t=0;::;+1
!
;
where b:c is the integer part. Then this game has the same sub-game perfect
equilibria than Gk([0; A]). Furthermore, any sub-game perfect equilibrium of
G([0; A]) is a sub-game perfect equilibrium for k. Indeed, after any history,
if a deviation for one player is protable for k, it will also be protable for .
So E(K0)  Ek (K0). It is more complicated to obtain the other inclusion, as
the set of sub-game perfect equilibria in Gk([0; A]) is bigger than in G([0; A])
(less deviations are feasible). So, the following Folk theorem is shown for
Gk([0; A]); but is not alreay extended to G([0; A]):
This result states that any payo¤of the usual repeated Cournot game
can be approximated, when  is close enough to 1, by some payo¤ resulting
of a sub-game perfect equilibrium of our discrete investment game Gk([0; A]).
Note that the limit set obtained is the same for all k, so intuitively we should
have the same result in the continuous case. However, this form of result is
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su¢ cient for economic interpretations, as we can restrict the investment to
unit of capacity as small as we want.
We have that the limit set of equilibrium payo¤s do not depend of the
initial capacities, no more than the investment price p+ or p . This is due to
the fact that when players are patient enough, there is no cost of investing,
as the price is divided in an innity of periods which have the same weight
when the players are innitely patient (  1). The interest of such limit
result is less clear than in the usual case. In the Cournot repeated game, the
prot of the monopoly is
 
A
2
2
, and the Folk Theorem gives that there exists
sub-game perfect Nash equilibria in which the industry makes prots close
to the monopoly prots when rms are patient enough. However in our case
the monopoly prots (and strategies) depend on , as shown in the following
corollary.
Corollary 1 (monopoly case) : If there is an only rm on the market,
with initial capacity K0, then its optimal strategy is to invest at the rst
period, to not move its capacity level after that, and to produce at full capacity:
8t > 0;
qt = Kt = ~q(0) =
8>><>>:
A (1 )p+
2
if 2K0  A  (1  )p+
Ki0 if A  (1  )p+ < 2K0 < A  (1  )p 
A (1 )p 
2
if 2K0  A  (1  )p 
9>>=>>; ;(7)
then the monopoly prot is
m =
8>>><>>>:

A (1 )p+
2
2
+ (1  )p+K0 if 2K0  A  (1  )p+
(A K0)K0 if A  (1  )p+ < 2K0 < A  (1  )p 
A (1 )p 
2
2
+ (1  ) p K0 if 2K0  A  (1  )p 
9>>>=>>>; : (8)
Proof. : Follows from proposition 1.
We nd a impact of initial capacities, not only on the monopoly
prot, but also on optimal capacities and quantities: there also exists a
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no-move area (depending on initial capacities and prices p+ and p ). This
phenomenum disappears when  converges to 1, as strategies and prots
converge to the ones of the repeated Cournot case.
Hence, the Folk Theorem only gives us that there exists equilibria
payo¤s of which the sum converges to the limit of the monopoly payo¤ (when
 ! 1). As the benchmark case tends to the equilibrium of the non-repeated
Cournot game (which is the benchmark of repeated Cournot game for collu-
sion), it shows the existence of collusive equilibria. However, several questions
remain:
- Given , what is the impact of initial capacities on the set of equi-
librium payo¤s?
- Can we nd a  such that there exists a collusive equilibrium which
maximizes joined prots? How do initial capacities (and capacity prices)
impact it?
- For a given level of prot, what are the discounted rate allowing
the existence of an equilibrium under which rms make such prot? How do
initial capacities impact it?
-How can collusion be sustained? Do rms need to use punishment
strategies on capacities, quantities or both?
A collusive equilibrium
In this part we study a particular case of collusion, when rms uses a
Grim-Trigger strategy on capacities and we etablishes a su¢ cient condition
to prove that this is a sub-game perfect ash equilibrium. The other kind of
collusion, (using only quantities, or capacities and quantities) is not study.
Furthermore, the question of how companies install collusion is not consid-
ered. In this part we will assume that rms have small initial capacities
(Ki0 <
A (1 )p+
n+1
).
Denition 3 : We dened the no-move Grim-Trigger strategy as the strat-
egy which consists for a rm to keep its initial capacity as long as the other
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rms do not move their capacity, and to go to the benchmark equilibrium
when someone deviates. Formally,
Si =
(
(Kit ; q
i
t) = (K
i
0; K
i
0) if for all j, K
j
t 1 = K
j
0
(Kit ; q
i
t) = (q
i [Kt 1] ; qi [Kt 1; ]) in the other case
)
: (9)
It is obvious that this strategy is a markovian strategy, as it only
depends of the state of the industry on the previous period. As the Grim-
Trigger strategy must be an equilibrium after any history, the good punish-
ment after deviation must be the competitive equilibrium of rms depending
of the capacity installed after that the deviation and not the competitive
equilibrium depending of initial capacity which may not be an equilibrium
after the change of capacity due to deviation. So the impact of a deviation is
double, changing the capacities at a precise time, and changing the compet-
itive equilibrium which follow. This imply that an industry which su¤ers a
period of collusion can, at the end of this period, have a di¤erent structure (in
the mean of capacities held by companies) that before the collusion. Hence
collusion have long-time impact on a market, even if the collusion period is
short. Note that the impact on the welfare of this change of structure is not
necessarily bad. The following result give a necessary and su¢ cient condition
for the existence of such no-move Grim-Trigger strategy in the duopoly case.
Proposition 3 (Duopoly case) : When n = 2, rm i has no interest to
deviate from the no-move Grim-Trigger strategy as long as the following con-
dition is veried:
 if Ki0 > A (1 )(2p
+ p )
3
;
Ki0(A Ki0  Kj0) 
 
A  (1  )p+  Kj0
2
!2
  (1  )p+Ki0 > 0; (10)
 if Ki0 < A (1 )(2p
+ p )
3
;
Ki0(A Ki0  Kj0) 
 
A  (1  )p+ + p   Kj0
2
!2
  (1  )p+Ki0
+ (1  )p A  (1  )(2p
+   p )
3
> 0:
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So the no-move Grim-Trigger strategy is a sub-game perfect Nash equi-
librium if and only if both rms verify this condition.
Proof. : see Annex 4. Note that the one shot deviation principle permits
to study the optimal deviation of the rst period without lost of generality.
The condition (10) has some unusual properties. Indeed, increasing
the discount rate decrease the possibility of collusion. So more the rms are
patient, more the collusion is di¤ucult to sustain. This results, in opposition
with the usual results on collusion is due to the fact the deviating rm deviate
to a competitive equilibirum, and so there is no punishment in stricto sensu
(see in the following graphic).
deviation in the rst case:
Ý0,0Þ
Ýq+, q+Þ
Ýq?,q?Þ
q! +
Ýq! +,q! ?Þ
H
Ýq! ?,q! +Þ
K02/q* 2
K01/q1
J
K
ÝK01,K02Þ
ÝK01,q2Þ
Ýq$ 1, q$ 2Þ
q! +
So the discount factor only impact the "real" price of capacity: more
patient rms can paid the capacity necessary to deviating at a higher price
today, as they value more the prot they will make in the next period. Note
that the selling price has no impact neither, as nobody will sell capacity.
Note that this reasoning are not valuable in the second condition, it means
when the initial capacity of rm is low.
In addition to these unusual results, the next proposition give a suf-
cient condition for the existence of the no-move Grim-Trigger strategy for
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a greater number of rms, and the numerical tables which follow seems to
prove that the number of rms has also an unusual impact.
Proposition 4 : The no-move Grim-Trigger strategy is a sub-game perfect
equilibrium if for all i,
(A  K0)Ki0   

A+ n(1  )p+)
n+ 1
  (1  )p 

A+ n(1  )p+)
n+ 1

  (1  )p+Ki0   (1  )

A K i0   p+ + p 
2
2
> 0
where K0 =
Pn
i=1K
i
0.
Proof. : Assume than rm i deviates at time 1 to a capacity Ki and a
quantity qi. After that, rm i must play the benchmark equilibrium. The
maximal prot for a benchmark equilibrium is smaller than the maximal
quantity produced when capacities belong to H multiplied by the maximal
price. The maximal quantity is A (1 )[(n+1)p
  np+]
n+1
and the maximal price,
A  n(A (1 )p+)
n+1
. So the maximal prot in H is smaller than
A  (1  )[(n+ 1)p    np+]
n+ 1

A+ n(1  )p+)
n+ 1

=

A+ n(1  )p+)
n+ 1
  (1  )p 

A+ n(1  )p+)
n+ 1

:
Furthermore, the immediate prot for deviating is (A qi K i0  p+)qi+
p+Ki0+p
 qi, as rms are assumed to have initial capacities smaller than the
capacities in H, which is maximized in qi = A K
 i
0  p++p 
2
. So the maximal
immediate prot for deviating is smaller than
(1  )

A K i0   p+ + p 
2
2
+ (1  )p+Ki0:
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The following tables gives numerical example of the condition (??), so
positive numbers imply collusion, but the reverse is not true, as the condition
is only su¢ cient. Note that this is obtain for symetric initial capacities which
maximize the joint prot. As it is show in the corollary 1, there is several
industry level of capacity which maximizes the joint pros. The rst number
correspond to the smallest such capacity and the second to the greatest.
A = 15; p+ = 2; p  = 1 :
nn 2 3 4
0:7 ( 0:36; 0:24) (0:30; 0:44) (0:37; 0:51)
0:8 (0:43; 0:49) (1:49; 1:55) (1:71; 1:77)
0:9 (1:60; 1:61) (2:95; 2:97) (3:28; 3:29)
A = 15; p+ = 3; p  = 1 :
nn 2 3 4
0:7 ( 1:28; 1:08) ( 0:37; 0:14) ( 0:12; 0:12)
0:8 ( 0:34; 0:26) (0:92; 1:03) (1:31; 1:41)
0:9 (1:13; 1:15) (2:62; 2:64) (3:04; 3:06)
A = 15; p+ = 3; p  = 2 :
nn 2 3 4
0:7 ( 1:11; 0:99) ( 0:32; 0:18) ( 0:16; 0:02)
0:8 ( 0:25; 0:20) (0:92; 0:99) (1:24; 1:30)
0:9 (1:16; 1:17) (2:60; 2:61) (2:98; 3:00)
A = 5; p+ = 3; p  = 2 :
nn 2 3 4
0:7 ( 1:11; 0:99) ( 0:32; 0:18) ( 0:16; 0:02)
0:8 ( 0:25; 0:20) (0:92; 0:99) (1:24; 1:30)
0:9 (1:16; 1:17) (2:60; 2:61) (2:98; 3:00)
This tables seem to indicate that an increase of the number of rms
increase the possibility of collusion. This can be due to the fact, when the
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number of rms increase, punishment is more severe and deviation more
expensive (even if it is more protable after the choice of capacity).
This part shows that there exists collusive equilibrium using no-move
Grim-Trigger strategy, which implies that rms produce at full capacity as
in the competitive equilibrium, and that their capacities remain constant
in time. Furthermore, the condition of the existance of such equilibrium
can be surprising due to the usual condition of collusion. Detecting this
kind of collusion may be di¢ cult, as the only di¤erence between competitive
equilibrium is in level of capacity.
4 Annex
Annex 1: Best responses in the non-collusive equilib-
rium
Proof. [Proof (Best response)] : Let qi+ = ~q+(q i) and qi  = ~q (q i)
Assume that the strategy of rm i does not depend of the time or of
the games history, so (Kit ; q
i
t) = (q
i; qi). Then the objective of player is to
maximize:
i(qi; qi; q i; q i) = (A qi+q i)qi (1 )p+(qi Ki0)++(1 )p (qi Ki0) ;
(11)
which can be rewritten as:
i(qi; qi; q i; q i) =
8>><>>:
(A  qi + q i)qi + (1  )p (Ki0   qi) if qi < Ki0
(A  qi + q i)qi if qi = Ki0
(A  qi + q i)qi   (1  )p+(qi  Ki0) if qi > Ki0
9>>=>>; :
This function is obviously continous in qi.
If qi+  qi  < Ki0, the function is increasing until qi , then decreasing
until Ki0, and then decreasing after that, So the function is maximum in q
i .
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If Ki0 < q
i+  qi , the function is increasing until Ki0, then increasing
until qi+, and then decreasing after that, so the function is maximum in qi+.
If qi+  Ki0  qi , the function is increasing until min(qi ; Ki0) = Ki0,
then decreasing after max(Ki0; q
i+) = Ki0. So the function is maximum in
Ki0.
We have
qi =
8>><>>:
qi+ if qi  < Ki0
Ki0 if q
i+  Ki0  qi 
qi  if Ki0 < q
i+
9>>=>>; : (12)
Now we will see that the rm cannot do better by using a more complex
strategy (remind that we assume here that other rms play a static strategy).
This is a dynamic programing issue, with control on qit and with objective
function:
i(qit; q
i
t; q
 i; q i) = (1  )
+1X
t=1
t 1

(A  qit + q i)qit   p+(qit   qit 1)+ + p (qit   qit 1) 

i(qit; q
i
t; q
 i; q i) = (1  ) (A  qi1 + q i)qi1   p+(qi1  Ki0)+ + p (qi1  Ki0) 
+i(qit+1; q
i
t+1; q
 i; q i)
Let i(Ki0) be the the maximum of prot the rm can make with initial
capacity Ki0. Than 
i veries:
i(Ki0) = max
qi1

v(qi1; K
i
0) + 
i(qi1)

; (13)
where
v(qi1; K
i
0) = (1  )

(A  qi1 + q i)qi1   p+(qi1  Ki0)+ + p (qi1  Ki0) 

:
If qi1  qi, then
v(qi1; K
i
0)
(1  ) = (A  q
i
1+ q
 i)qi1  p+(qi Ki0)++ p (qi Ki0)   p+(qi1  qi);
(because (:)  and (:)+ are linear). Furthermore,
i(qi)  i(qi1)  (1  )p+(qi1   qi):
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This is the case because there exists an optimal solution (the theorem of
Tychono¤ gives us that (in french, lensemble des suites à valeurs dans un
compact est compact) the set of sequences with values in a compact is com-
pact, and i(qit; q
i
t; q
 i; q i) is continuous in qit); so from q
i we can go to the
optimal solution from qi1 at a cost p
+(qi1   qi). This implies:
v(qi1; K
i
0) + 
i(qi1)  v(qi1; Ki0) + i(qi) + (1  )p+(qi1   qi):
So, for qi1 > q
i; maximizing equation (13) is equivalent to maximize:
(A  qi1 + q i)qi1   p+(qi1   qi)  p+(qi1   qi):
We know that
(A qi1+q i)qi1 (1 )p+(qi1 qi) is maximized in qi1 =
A  q i   (1  )p+
2
;
and as A q
 i (1 )p+
2
 qi, v(qi1; Ki0) + i(qi1) is increasing until qi.
By the same reasoning, we have, if qi1  qi:
v(qi1; K
i
0)
(1  ) = (A  q
i
1+ q
 i)qi1  p+(qi Ki0)++ p (qi Ki0) + p (qi  qi1);
and
i(qi1)  i(qi) + (1  )p (qi   qi1):
This implies the fact that maximizing equation (13) is equivalent to maxi-
mize:
(A  qi1 + q i)qi1 + p (qi   qi1) + p (qi   qi1);
and so v(qi1; K
i
0) + 
i(qi1) is decreasing until q
i.
qi(Ki0) maximizes (13), and, as q
i(qi(Ki0)) = q
i(Ki0), the optimal solu-
tion is qit = q
i(Ki0).
Annex 2: The benchmark equilibrium
Proof. [Proof (Benchmark equilibrium)] : We start to prove that, if q^ =
(q^1; ::; q^n) is a sub-game perfect equilibrium of the benchmark form, it mini-
mizes
Pn
i=1 jqi  Ki0j for q = (q1; ::; qn) 2 H (1). Then, we prove there exists
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only one q 2 H which minimizes Pni=1 jqi  Ki0j (2). After that we prove
that if q^ minimizes
Pn
i=1 jqi  Ki0j for q 2 H, it is a sub-game perfect equi-
librium (3). This etablishes the existence and unicity of the sub-game perfect
equilibrium and characterizes it as the argmin(q1;::;qn)2H
Pn
i=1 jqi  Ki0j.
(1) Assume that q^ = (q^1; ::; q^n) is a sub-game perfect equilibrium. Let
E+ = fi 2 f1; ::; ng : q^i = ~q+(q^ i)g = i 2 f1; ::; ng : Ki0 < q^i	
E  = fi 2 f1; ::; ng : q^i = ~q (q^ i)g = i 2 f1; ::; ng : Ki0 > q^i	
E0 = fi 2 f1; ::; ng : q^i = Ki0g =

i 2 f1; ::; ng : ~q (q^ i)  Ki0  ~q+(q^ i)
	
:
For q 2 H, let
Iq = fi 2 f1; ::; ng : qi 6= q^ig:
Let Pk be the proposition: for all q 2 H, such that card(Iq) = k, then
d(q;K0)  d(q^; K0): We will show it by recurrence.
For k = 1; q = q^ except in one i. There are three possibilities:
 i 2 E0, then q^i = Ki0 and jq^i  Ki0j  jqi  Ki0j.
 i 2 E+, then as q 2 H, qi  ~q+(q i) = ~q+(q^ i) = q^i > Ki0, so
qi  Ki0  q^i  Ki0 > 0.
 i 2 E , then as q 2 H, qi  ~q (q i) = ~q (q^ i) = q^i < Ki0, so
qi  Ki0  q^i  Ki0 < 0.
This implies that jqi  Ki0j  jq^i  Ki0j so
Pn
i=1 jqi  Ki0j 
Pn
i=1 jq^i  Ki0j.
Assume that Pk 1 is true.
Let q 2 H, such that card(Iq) = k. Then let { = argmaxi2Iq(jqi  Ki0j  
jq^i  Ki0j): Let qj = qj if j 6= { and q{ = q^{: We have that card(Iq) = k   1,
so, by Pk 1, d(q;K0)  d(q^; K0), which meansX
Iqn{
(
qi  Ki0  q^i  Ki0)  0:
But (jq{  K{0j   jq^{  K{0j)  (jqi  Ki0j   jq^i  Ki0j) for all i 2 Iqn{. So
(jq{  K{0j   jq^{  K{0j)  0: Hence, we have:X
Iq
(
qi  Ki0  q^i  Ki0)  0
, d(q;K0)  d(q^; K0):
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By recurrence, Pk is true for all k = 1; ::n, so if q^ is an equilibrium,
q^ 2 argminq2H
Pn
i=1 jqi  Ki0j :
(2) Now, as by proposition 1, H 6= ?, there exists at least one q 2 H
which minimizes
Pn
i=1 jqi  Ki0j, we have to show that this q is unique. For
that we assume that there exists q^ and q in argminq2H
Pn
i=1 jqi  Ki0j such
that q^ 6= q.
In this case we have [q; q^]  argminq2H
Pn
i=1 jqi  Ki0j.
(Indeed, 8q 2 [q; q^],Pni=1 jqi  Ki0j = Pni=1 jqi  Ki0j+(1  )Pni=1 jq^i  Ki0j,
so
Pn
i=1 jqi  Ki0j = minq2H
Pn
i=1 jqi  Ki0j).
Furthermore, if q 2 argminq2H
Pn
i=1 jqi  Ki0j and K0 =2 H, q 2 fr(H).
(Indeed, if q =2 fr(H), 9q 2 [q;Ki0] such that q 2 H, i.e. 9 2]0; 1[
such that q = q+(1 )Ki0 2 H. Hence,
Pn
i=1 jqi  Ki0j = 
Pn
i=1 jqi  Ki0j <
minq2H
Pn
i=1 jqi  Ki0j ; which is a contradiction).
Note that if K0 2 H; there is a single obvious solution, q = K0:
Then we show that 9i 2 f1; ::; ng; s 2 f+; g such that 8q 2 [q; q^],
qi = ~qs(q i).
Assume that there is no s 2 f+; g; i 2 f1; ::; ng such that q^i =
~qs(q^ i) and qi = ~qs(q i). This means that for all s 2 f+; g;
i 2 f1; ::; ng; q^i 6= ~qs(q^ i) and qi 6= ~qs(q i):
In this case let q = 1
2
q + 1
2
q^, then for all i; s;
qi 6= 1
2
~qs(q i) +
1
2
~qs(q^ i) = ~qs(q i);
which contradicts the fact that q 2 fr(H). So there exists i 2 f1; ::; ng; s 2
f+; g, such that q^i = ~qs(q^ i) and qi = ~qs(q i), hence
8; if q = q + (1  )q^, then qi = ~qs(q i ):
Now, we can contradict the assumption q^ 6= q.
Let,  2]0; 1[, then 9"^ such that, for j"j  "^; q+" 2 [q; q^], so, for
some s; i qi+" = ~q
s(q i+") = ~q
s(q i )  12("q "q^) i; so qi+" = qi  "2(q  q^) i =
qi+"   "(q   q^)i   "2(q   q^) i. Let  = 12 [(q   q^)i +
Pn
i=1(q   q^)i], then
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Pn
j=1
qj+"  Kj0 =Pnj=1
j 6=i
qj+"  Kj0+qi+"  Ki0   ". If " = qi+" Ki0jqi+" Ki0j max("^; 1),
then j"j  "^ and qi+"  Ki0   " = qi+"  Ki0 j"j, soPnj=1 qj+"  Kj0 =Pn
j=1
qj+"  Kj0  j"j, as  > 0; " > 0, this not possible.
So, there is only one q 2 H which minimizes Pni=1 jqi  Ki0j :
(3) Assume q^ = minq2H
Pn
i=1 jqi  Ki0j. Fixe i 2 f1; ::; ng: Assume that q
is not an equilibrium. Then there exists i such that ~q(q i) 6= qi.
To prove that q is an equilibrium it is su¢ cient to see that ~q(q i) = q.
We know that q 2 H. Then, let qj = qj if j 6= i and qi = ~q(q i), we have
q 2 H. Then there are three possibilities:
- ~q(q i) = Ki0, then
nX
i=1
qi  Ki0  nX
i=1
qi  Ki0 ,
so q = q and qi = ~q(q i).
- ~q(q i) > Ki0, then q
i = ~q+(q i) > Ki0, so in this case q
i  ~q+(q i)
(as if q 2 H, qi  q+(q i)) and qi  Ki0, so
nX
i=1
qi  Ki0  nX
j=1
j 6=i
qj  Kj0+qi Ki0  nX
j=1
j 6=i
qj  Kj0+qi Ki0  nX
i=1
qi  Ki0 ;
so q = q and qi = ~q(q i).
- ~q(q i) < Ki0, then q
i = ~q (q i) < Ki0, so in this case q
i  ~q(q i)
(as if q 2 H, qi  q (q i)) and qi  Ki0, so
nX
i=1
qi  Ki0  nX
j=1
j 6=i
qj  Kj0+Ki0 qi  nX
j=1
j 6=i
qj  Kj0+Ki0 qi  nX
i=1
qi  Ki0 ;
so q = q and qi = ~q(q i).
Annex 3: The Folk Theorem
Proof. : Part 1: We use the theorem 2 (page 23) of the article of Johannes
Hörner and all (2010), with Y =k [0; A]n is the set of quantities played by the
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players at the previous round, Ai =k f0; Ag2 is the set of (Ki; qi) chosen at
one period, and S =k f0; Agn is the set of capacities at the previous time. Let
Ek (K0) be the set of all sub-game perfect equilibrium payo¤s in GIk([0; A]).
Let Ri [K0; (Kj; qj)j 6=i] be the matrix of size kf0; Ag2kf0; Agn such that,
for all (Ki; qi); K1; q1
Ri

(Ki; qi);K1; q1

= 1fKj1=Kj and qj1=qj ;8j=1;::ng;
so Ri has rank card (kf0; Ag2). So every pure action has individual full rank
for all players.
Let
Rik

K0; (K
j; qj)nj=1

=

Ri [K0; (K
j; qj)j 6=i]
Rk [K0; (Kj; qj)j 6=k]

:
Note that Ri [(Ki; qi);K1; q1] = 1 = Ri [(Kj; qj);K1; q1] if and only if Ki =
Ki1, K
j = Ki1, q
i = qi1 and q
j = qi1 which arrises only one time on kf0; Ag2k
f0; Ag2: This implies that Rik has rank 2  card (kf0; Ag2)   1, so for each
state K0 and each pair (i; k) of players, all pure strategies have pairwise full
rank.
So conditions F1 and F2 of the article of Hörner and all (2010) are
veried, and we can use the theorem.
Part 2 : We nd the set of feasible and individualy rational payo¤s of
the stochastic game.
Let mi(K0) be the min-max value of player i (in the game GIk([0; A]
n)
). We show that mi(K0)  (1  )p Ki0.
Indeed, if the other players than i play the strategy q it = K
 i
t = A then
the best response of player i is to sell all his capacity as soon as possible.
In this case he makes a prot of (1   )p Ki0. So mi(K0)  (1   )p Ki0.
Hence lim!1mi(K0) = 0. The Folk theorem of Hörner and all (2010) gives
that the limit set of the feasible payo¤ of the game GIk([0; A]n) is the limit
of Ek (K0) when  ! 1.
Now, we will show that the limit set of all the feasible payo¤s inGIk([0; A]n)
is F .
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First, we will see that, if we call F k (K0) the set of feasible payo¤s in
GIk([0; A]
n), F   lim!1 F k (K0).
By using the strategy (0; Ki0) the player i can have 0 prot, so (0; ::; 0) is
feasible for all F k (K0).
In the same idea if the player i plays the monopoly strategy
 
A
2
; A
2

and
all other rms plays the previous strategy, i has a prot of
A
2
2
  (1  )p+

A
2
 K0i

+
+ (1  )p 

A
2
 K0i

 
;
and the other 0. Hence the payo¤s vector which gives zero for all rm except
for one and
 
A
2
2
for this one, is in the limit set of feasible payo¤s (as the
limit of payo¤s in F k (K0)). So, by convexity, F
  lim!1 F k (K0).
Now, we will show that \K0 lim!1 F k (K0)  F : Assume that K0 = 0:
Then the sum of the prots of all rms can be written as
nX
i=1
i = (1  )
+1X
t=1
t 1
 
nX
i=1
it
!
nX
i=1
i = (1  )
+1X
t=1
t 1
 
nX
i=1
~it
!
+(1  )
+1X
t=1
t 1
 
nX
i=1
p (Kit  Kit 1)    p+(Kit  Kit 1)+
!
:
As K0 = 0;
+1X
t=1
t 1
 
nX
i=1
p (Kit  Kit 1)    p+(Kit  Kit 1)+
!
 0:
Furthermore, 
nX
i=1
~it
!
=
nX
i=1
(A Qt)qit = (A Qt)Qt 

A
2
2
:
So,
Pn
i=1
i   A
2
2
and F k (0)  F  for all : This implies that \K0 lim!1 F k (K0) =
F .
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So, we have that
F  = lim
!1
Ek (K0). (14)
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